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Discussing cables
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VZCZCXRO9296
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHWR #1346/01 3301507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251507Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7392
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 WARSAW 001346
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/ERA, OES
STATE PLEASE PASS TRANSITION TEAM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ENRG SENV KGHG ECON EAGR EUN
NATO, OSCE, KNNP, RU, IR, PL
SUBJECT: USEU AMBASSADOR SILVERBERG DISCUSSES RUSSIA,
ENERGY SECURITY, IRAN, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND CAP WITH POLISH
OFFICIALS
REF: A. WARSAW 1295
¶B. WARSAW 1271
Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Polish officials told USEU Ambassador
Kristen Silverberg that Poland reluctantly agreed to support
resumption of negotiations on the EU-Russia Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement after the French Presidency made clear
no consensus was needed to move forward. The decision not to
push back was in large part driven by the desire to restore
Poland's credibility in Brussels and to avoid being seen as
reflexively Russophobic. While anxious to promote EU energy
solidarity, President Kaczynski and PM Tusk do not want to
transfer too much authority to the Commission. The MFA
supports continued NATO discussion on sharing threat
assessments on Iran to better influence the EU's internal
thinking and approach. Russia's security concerns are better
discussed in the OSCE than in the NATO-Russia Council. The
GoP is pleased with the success of its efforts to assemble a
blocking minority on the EU's emissions package and is
focused on finding a compromise that will reduce emissions
without threatening economic growth or competitiveness.
Agriculture Minister Sawicki indicated that Poland intends to
maintain the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and noted
Poland is loosening internal regulations on GMO and biotech.
European Integration Commission Minister Dowgielewicz
proposed a spring 2009 conference in Washington focused on
U.S.-EU cooperation in Eastern Europe. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) During a November 17 visit to Warsaw, USEU Ambassador
Kristen Silverberg and EconOff Lorelei Snyder met with: Marek
Sawicki, Minister of Agriculture; Piotr Kownacki, Head of the
Presidential Chancellery; Adam Kobieracki, MFA Director for
Security Policy; Witold Sobkow, MFA Political Director;
Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz, MFA Director for Eastern Policy; Michal
Boni, Adviser to Prime Minister Tusk; Mikolaj Dowgielewicz,
European Integration Commission (UKIE) Minister; and Piotr
Serafin, UKIE Deputy Minister.
"RELUCTANT" SUPPORT FOR EU-RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS
¶3. (C) MFA Eastern Policy Department Director Bratkiewicz
said French officials were adamant that no consensus was
needed to resume negotiations on a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), notwithstanding language in the
September 1 Council Conclusions stating that there could be
no negotiations until Russia withdraws to pre-August 7
positions. Bratkiewicz and MFA Political Director Sobkow
speculated that French President Sarkozy had a personal stake
in the decision, because he did not want his efforts to
mediate between Georgia and Russia to be considered a
failure. Sobkow said French officials refused to consider
releasing Conclusions on the PCA after the November 10 GAERC
because of concerns that the text might make reference to
deficiencies in the August 12 agreement, which Sarkozy
negotiated. Overall they said EU energy concerns were the
clear driver for PCA negotiations.
¶4. (C) Bratkiewicz conceded that Poland and Lithuania had
acted "too late" to oppose negotiations, by which time France
had already made clear it would achieve its goals, "no matter
what." He argued that it is not realistic to expect Russia
to withdraw from South Ossetia or Abkhazia anytime soon.
Rather than opposing resumption of negotiations, Poland
pushed for conditionality on implementation of the PCA after
negotiations conclude. Bratkiewicz and Sobkow speculated
that PCA negotiations with Russia will drag on for years,
pointing out that Russia is satisfied with the existing PCA.
¶5. (C) Sobkow speculated that France is working hard to
predetermine Eastern policy for the Czech and Swedish
presidencies. Both countries, along with Poland and
Lithuania, are perceived by Germany, France, and Italy as
Russophobes that instinctively -- and irresponsibly -- act
against Russia. Bratkiewicz said Germany is especially
suspicious of Polish motivations, a perception created by the
previous Polish government's "overbearing" approach in
Brussels. Sobkow said Poland is working to overcome the
Brussels "cliche" that Poland is "completely entangled in
history." Bratkiewicz pointed out that no one in Brussels
listens to the Lithuanians. In order to gain credibility
with other Member States, Sobkow said, FM Sikorski is trying
demonstrate a degree of moderation in his approach to Russia:
WARSAW 00001346 002 OF 005
"We can operate more effectively from the middle, rather
than from the margins
."
¶6. (C) On Russia's proposal for a new European security
dialogue, MFA Security Department Director Koberiacki said
Poland is "prepared to discuss Russian concerns, but not a
new security architecture -- it is not needed." He added
that neither NATO nor the EU should get involved in strategic
discussions with Russia without first developing their own
strategic concepts. NATO cannot wait, it has to know what we
want to achieve. Poland feels the appropriate place to
discuss Russian concerns with Russia is in the OSCE, not the
NATO-Russia Council.
RUSSIA / ENERGY SECURITY
¶7. (C) Ambassador Silverberg encouraged Poland to leverage
competition authorities, diversify energy resources including
interconnect grids, and cooperate regionally to mitigate
Russian overbearance. Polish officials expressed unease
about the potential for "Russian blackmail" on gas and agreed
that the EU must do more to promote European energy
solidarity. Piotr Kownacki, head of the Presidential
Chancellery, expressed concern that EU member states are
putting their own national interests first. MFA Political
Director Sobkow said Member States are worried about what
might happen if Russia is unable to deliver on its gas
contracts, adding that Poland expects a 25 percent shortfall
by 2012-2015. Because smaller EU member states want to make
sure they get their due, they are reluctant to support an
EU-wide energy strategy that gives too much influence to
large member states and the Commission.
¶8. (C) Kownacki noted that President Kaczynski has been an
active proponent of energy solidarity, hosting and attending
energy summits and promoting energy corridors that are
independent of Russian influence. He said NATO and EU
"ambiguity" with respect to Ukraine and Georgia is
"dangerous" and could drive Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan closer
to Russia. To prevent this, the EU and the U.S. must
convince the presidents of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that
they will not lose power if they oppose Russian dominance.
Kownacki said President Aliyev had told President Kaczynski
that he is interested in continuing projects aimed at
European energy independence but fears that Russia will act
against him. If Russia is successful in removing Georgian
President Saakashvili, Aliyev will feel isolated and turn to
Russia. Russia's troop maneuvers near Azerbaijan had
provoked only a soft response from the international
community.
¶9. (C) Asked about Polish thoughts on President Bush's letter
on energy security, Kownacki and MFA officials expressed
skepticism that EU competition authorities would be able to
limit Gazprom's activities. "Unlike Microsoft, Gazprom is a
state," Bratkiewicz said. Kownacki said foreign oil and gas
companies in Russia have repeatedly shown they are willing to
accept Russia's conditions on market access. He argued that
EU rules are not strong enough to counteract Gazprom's
determination -- "we could easily discover in the near future
that a number of European companies are already owned by
Gazprom." The EU authorities have been stricter against EU
Member States than against Russia, he added.
¶10. (C) Ambassador Silverberg expressed regret that the
Gazprom clause in the Commission's energy proposal had not
granted stronger shared authority to both the Commission and
Member States. Kownacki said President Kaczynski would have
supported creating an independent authority, but he could not
accept transferring national authority to the Commission, due
to the already limited leverage that smaller Member States
have with the Commission. Dowgielewicz said the Government
had also concluded that it would be dangerous to transfer too
much power to the Commission, leaving Member States no
independent ability to restrict third country purchases.
Sobkow and Bratkiewicz, however, seemed open to supporting a
stronger Commission role. Both Kownacki and Dowgielewicz
expressed support for opening the energy chapter with Turkey.
IRAN, NONPROLIFERATION
¶11. (C/NF) Ambassador Silverberg voiced frustration over the
difficulty in ensuring rapid and strong implementation of
WARSAW 00001346 003 OF 005
UNSCRs on Iran. Noting other key actors would go no further
than the EU's minimalist approach, she suggested the EU look
further at designations, the insurance sector, and other
financial leverage the EU could take to enhance the P5 1
process. Kobieracki sympathized but warned that the U.S.
will likely be frustrated with the EU,s future stance as
well due to continued divergences between the U.S. and "some
EU member states'" threat assessment on Iran. The EU is
sensitive to avoiding an internal split along the lines of
the previous Iraq divergences. Kobieracki recommended that
the USG continue the initiative by former U.S. NATO
Ambassador Nuland to share intelligence assessments on Iran
with the North Atlantic Council for discussion. Despite the
EU's inability to coordinate NATO positions, messages
conveyed via the NAC can influence parallel EU discussions,
especially via the EU Presidency which provides formal
read-outs to the EU.
¶12. (C) Kobieracki likened the NPT to Mark Twain's line: the
rumors of its death have been greatly exaggerated. He
expects the arms control and disarmament agenda to return to
the forefront of the international agenda. "We will start
next year" on addressing Russia's conventional arms. The
Proliferation Security Initiative would benefit from clearer
guidance and needs an overall boost.
GAMBLING ON BELARUS
¶13. (C) On Belarus, Bratkiewicz acknowledged that Poland had
"gambled" that suspending the EU visa ban would initiate a
period of dialogue with the GoB. "It was clear that
isolation was not working," he argued. "There was no
reasonable alternative." Bratkiewicz said it is far from
clear that suspension of the six-month visa ban will induce
any real change in Belarus. Sobkow said Poland assesses that
Belarus is increasingly concerned about maintaining its
independence and sovereignty and is looking for opportunities
to counterbalance Russian influence by attracting Western
investment. Belarusian authorities are "terrified" about the
effect of the economic crisis on gas and oil prices,
Bratkiewicz added, noting that Belarus' welfare programs are
funded by reselling Russian gas. He speculated on the
increased likelihood that Belarus will soon recognize South
Ossetia and Abkhazia.
ESDP - "NO LONGER SKEPTICAL, STILL REALISTIC"
¶14. (C) Kobieracki said Poland is "no longer skeptical, but
wants to be realistic" about ESDP. Any meaningful
development of ESDP must focus on pragmatic cooperation and
be driven by necessity rather than idealized visions.
Kobieracki argued that the EU and NATO must each do more to
merge military
and civilian planning and that planners in
each organization could benefit from closer dialogue: the EU
could learn much from NATO military planners, and NATO would
benefit from EU civilian operations. Kobieracki said Poland
expects that HighRep Solana's security strategy proposal will
be less ambitious and more general than originally planned,
speculating that poor relations with the French Presidency
may have played a role.
¶15. (C) Kobieracki characterized the EUPOL mission in
Afghanistan as a "total failure, disaster and
disappointment-- to put it mildly." The mission's only added
value is that it puts an EU flag over national efforts. He
said German and French officials had privately acknowledged
EUPOL's failure, admitting that national plans to increase
the number of police trainers would not resolve the problem.
Kobieracki suggested a trilateral, mid-level discussion group
is needed in Brussels to improve coordination among the U.S.,
NATO, and the EU. Kobieracki said a French proposal to
establish a High Level Group would be less valuable, but
could help to send a signal for bureaucrats to cooperate.
¶16. (C) EULEX has been held up due to a few EU Member States'
-- e.g., Spain, Portugal, Slovakia -- delay in recognizing
Kosovo, Kobieracki explained. In general, the GoP is
undertaking a review to rationalize Poland's involvement in
different peace-keeping and stabilization operations. They
are increasing emphasis on meaningful, not just symbolic,
participation. "We can,t be everywhere, and we want to
consolidate. The priority is on Afghanistan and ISAF,"
Kobieracki stressed. Poland remains under pressure from EU
partners to engage in Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo,
WARSAW 00001346 004 OF 005
Golan Heights, and other missions. Poland will decide to
stay where it is most important.
CLIMATE CHANGE - "POLAND IS THE CHINA OF EUROPE"
¶17. (C) Michal Boni, a close advisor to Prime Minister Tusk,
said climate change negotiations in Brussels had long been a
priority for Tusk. Tusk supports long-term conversion to
renewables and nuclear energy, but realizes that for the near
future, Poland will be heavily reliant on its large coal
reserves. As a result, Poland is concerned that the EU
emissions package not jeopardize Poland's economic
competitiveness; the Poles want to promote compromises that
will address climate change without limiting economic
development. Poland is focused on promoting investment in
new technologies and creating conditions for long-term
conversion to alternative energy sources. Serafin stressed
that Poland is the China of Europe. If the EU can find a
solution that works for the UK, Sweden, Germany, France, and
Poland, there is an increased likelihood of reaching
agreement on a UN framework that works for developed and
emerging economies.
¶18. (C) Boni said Polish efforts to build a coalition of
Member States to lobby the French Presidency for changes to
the EU emissions package had achieved more than initially
expected. Serafin noted that there had previously been a
lack of assertiveness among new EU Member States, who were
taken by surprise by the Commission's proposed emissions
package, particularly its far-reaching economic consequences.
He noted that much of the work on the package had been done
by environment ministries, which had not considered the
potentially damaging effects on economic growth and
competitiveness.
¶19. (C) Notwithstanding Poland's successful
coalition-building, Dowgielewicz said there is still a
"complete lack of understanding" of Poland's position among
older member states. He explained that Poland remains
concerned about the volatility of carbon prices and highly
skeptical of Commission projections that carbon permits would
settle out at 30 euros per ton. Poland has seen estimates
that carbon prices could be two to three times higher, which
would spell disaster for Poland's economy -- currently the
second-most energy intensive in Europe. To protect against
potential price spikes, Poland is pushing the idea of a
safety valve that would establish a minimum and maximum price
for carbon credits. To that end, Boni and Dowgielewicz
emphasized the GOP's request that Congressional Budget Office
Director Peter Orszag, who has spoken before Congress in
favor of such floors and ceilings, or other U.S. experts
speak in European venues on these "highly technical, highly
complex" issues with real economic consequences. Such USG
participation would help dispel the erroneous myth
(promulgated in part by the Commission and the French
Presidency) that U.S. experts lag behind the EU's thinking on
creative solutions. Dowgielewicz is personally raising
awareness of U.S. efforts in private EU discussions.
¶20. (C) Dowgielewicz said the chances of achieving a final
deal on EU emissions in December are weak. While the EU
might be able to agree on certain elements, it would be
difficult to reach consensus on the specifics of emissions
trading and redistribution of carbon permits. Even if
negotiations are not successful on the technical level, he
speculated, EU leaders have high expectations and may agree
to declare they have reached a deal, while setting aside
certain issues to be resolved later. The French are pressing
for quick EU adoption and telling fellow EU members that the
incoming U.S. administration will agree to the EU position
without any strings attached. Dowgielewicz believes this is
nonsense and thinks "it would be good for everyone to lower
expectations about what the new U.S. administration may be
able to do." The world needs to know soon what conditions
are necessary for agreement by the Obama administration.
AGRICULTURAL REFORM
¶21. (C) Agriculture Minister Sawicki told Ambassador
Silverberg that without France and Poland cooperating, there
would be no CAP after 2013. Poland intends to keep CAP
going. He said that the CAP Health Check will not be a
breakthrough, it will be a continuation of current policy
with minor changes. While there may be some changes to CAP,
WARSAW 00001346 005 OF 005
they will not take effect until 2014 -- i.e, the Health Check
will only have an impact to the extent that it creates a
direction for future change. Sawicki said that the
Commission must act soon to relieve Polish farmers suffering
from low prices for grain and meat. (Comment: Sawicki
strongly supports the Commission using export subsidies to
reduce the grain mountain piled up in Poland. End Comment.)
¶22. (C) Sawicki said he is not personally opposed to GMO or
biotechnology, but for "political reasons" cannot advocate a
better policy. He said he did not think the Doha Round and
changing the CAP would make developing countries more
wealthy, adding that more investment in developing countries 

;is needed to increase agricultural production, including
biotechnology. Sawicki did not respond to Silverberg's
assertion that Commissioner Boel points to Poland as one of
the Member States that is blocking more liberal approaches to
the CAP and that strongly opposes biotechnology.
LISBON TREATY
¶23. (C) Acording to Kownacki, President Kaczynski continues
to await an emerging consensus way forward on the EU's reform
treaty before deciding the time is right to sign off on
Poland's agreement.
COMMENT
¶24. (C) Concerned about maximizing Polish effectiveness in
Brussels, PM Tusk and FM Sikorski have repeatedly
demonstrated reluctance to take isolated positions. In large
part this is driven by a desire to distance themselves from
the previous government and to avoid being seen as emotional,
irrational Russophobes. Poland's successful forging of a
blocking minority on the EU's emissions package and its
efforts with Sweden to promote the Eastern Partnership
indicate that Tusk's Government is still strongly interested
in articulating and defending Polish interests, but prefers
to do so in coordination with -- or under the cover of --
other EU Member States. Poland will continue to be a strong
like-minded U.S. partner on most issues in Brussels, but may
need more encouragement from us or even assistance in
building alliances with other EU Member States.
¶25. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador
Silverberg.
ASHE
Wikileaks: Poland 