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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10WARSAW112.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10WARSAW112 | 2010-02-22 18:24 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Warsaw |
VZCZCXRO0087 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHWR #0112/01 0531824 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221824Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9441 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000112 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE, INR NSC FOR HOVENIER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PL SUBJECT: POLAND - CIVIC PLATFORM PRIMARY GIVES SIKORSKI A SHOT REF: WARSAW 62 Classified By: Ambassador Lee Feinstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Civic Platform's (PO) decision to break with longstanding Polish tradition and hold primary elections to decide the party's nominee for president has created an opening for FM Radoslaw Sikorski, one of two declared candidates for the nomination. While the majority of party members personally favor Sikorski's opponent, Sejm Speaker Bronislaw Komorowski, a growing number feel that Sikorski stands a better chance of soundly defeating incumbent President Lech Kaczynski. According to PO insiders, the party's 45,000 members will ultimately have to decide whether Sikorski's ability to attract young voters outweighs his lack of political experience and the risk that he might be "too independent" as president. Sikorski's greater strength in current polls could mean a more dramatic PO victory in the September-October presidential elections, which would leave the party well positioned ahead of local elections (November-December 2010) and parliamentary elections in 2011. According to recent polls, either Sikorski or Komorowski would defeat Kaczynski in a head-to-head race. The main question is by how large a margin. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The Civic Platform's (PO) national board voted February 16 to hold primary elections to decide the party's nominee for president. The PO's approximately 45,000 members will be asked to vote by Internet or mail for either Sejm Speaker Bronislaw Komorowski or FM Radoslaw Sikorski. Ballots must be submitted by the end of March. The winner will be announced in early April and formally nominated at the party's May 16 convention. The PO's decision marks a break with the longstanding Polish tradition that party leaders choose election candidates. A primary would validate the eventual candidate, whether FM Sikorski or Speaker Komorowski, thus easing potential friction within PO that could arise through a heated, six-week internal campaign. Thus far, Komorowski and Sikorski have spoken highly of each other and pledged to support whomever is chosen to be the party's nominee. The candidates' respective backers within PO have been less restrained. SIKORSKI V. KOMOROWSKI ¶3. (C) While Komorowski is favored by the majority of board members and most of PO's regional leadership, opening the ballot to the party's entire membership could benefit Sikorski, who is widely seen as more attractive to young voters. High youth turnout in 2007 tipped the electoral balance in PO's favor. ¶4. (C) Most party members prefer Komorowski, who has been a PO member since the party was founded and is viewed as more reliable and less of a wild card. In addition there is concern about Sikorski's loyalty. He joined PO in December 2007 after breaking with the opposition Law and Justice (PiS). Sikorski caucused with PiS in parliament and served as defense minister under the PiS government from September 2005-February 2007. He left PiS because of differences with PiS chair Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the twin of the current president. Despite these concerns, a growing number of PO members say they believe Sikorski has a better chance of soundly defeating incumbent President Kaczynski. A battle between former allies is likely to increase voter turnout, which would favor PO, and Sikorski is widely considered to be a stronger campaigner. A dramatic victory would leave PO well positioned ahead of local elections in November/December and parliamentary elections in 2011. ¶5. (C) Michal Szczerba, a PO member of parliament who recently joined Komorowski's campaign team, acknowledged the challenges of drawing young voters to the polls in support of Komorowski. Like Kaczynski, Komorowski tends to be stiff and formal in public appearances. He and the president are approximately the same age (Kaczynski is 3 years older than Komorowski) and both viewed as professional politicians. "How will we get young voters excited about a race between two grandfathers?" Szczerba asked. ¶6. (C) Szczerba predicted support within PO for Sikorski would level off. While acknowledging that Sikorski would win if primary elections were open to non-members of PO, he expressed confidence that party members would choose Komorowski's "experience and predictability" over the risk that Sikorski, as president, might be "too independent." COMMENT: In addition, prolonged tensions with Belarus could cause voters to question Sikorski's credentials as a WARSAW 00000112 002 OF 002 statesman. Sikorski has been the main architect of Poland's intiative to engage the Lukashenka regime (reported septel). END COMMENT. ¶7. (C) The fact that Komorowski is supported by the majority of PO's national board, including PM Tusk's Number Two, Grzegorz Schetyna, will also help Komorowski tremendously, as will the endorsement of former FM Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. PO 
 ;members also fear that Sikorski will be caricatured by PiS as an "import" from outside the party -- and from outside Poland. WHY PRIMARIES? ¶8. (C) By holding a primary, the already strong PO aims to present itself as the more democratic party, further distancing PO from the opposition Law and Justice (PiS), which is tightly controlled by Jaroslaw Kaczynski. The primaries also give PO free publicity and virtually ensure the party's politicians will dominate the news for the next six weeks. ¶9. (C) Some pundits dismissed the decision to hold primaries as a preemptive maneuver by PM Tusk to diffuse blame in the event PO's candidate is defeated. Tusk says, however, that support for primary elections was among the PO's founding principles. According to Michal Marcinkiewicz, a 26-year-old PO parliamentarian, holding primary elections will innoculate Tusk and the party against accusations from PO founder and former Tusk confidante Andrzej Olechowski, who is running for president as an independent, that Tusk has abandoned his vision of building a modern, transparent, democratic political party. Tusk also hopes that primary elections will ease deep-seated public distrust of politicians -- at least distrust of PO politicians -- and help to increase PO's membership. ¶10. (C) Szczerba acknowledged the more utilitarian aspects of the decision to hold primaries. By absolving himself of responsibility for choosing PO's candidate, Tusk does not have to choose between leaders of the various factions within the party. By staying above the fray, Tusk will be able to maintain firm control of the party and keep the factions united. In addition, the PO's long-term viability will not be threatened if PO's candidate loses the presidential election. Throughout the election, Tusk will remain the face of the party, Szczerba said. ¶11. (C) Marcinkiewicz agreed that concerns about PO divisions arising from the primary are overstated. As an example, he cited Tusk's response to February 10 anti-Sikorski comments made by PO's Janusz Palikot, a Komorowski backer. Palikot publicly expressed concern about "the independence and strong international position" of Sikorski's wife -- an American citizen who writes a column for The Washington Post. After Palikot's comments hit the newswires, Tusk told PO parliamentarians that he would expel any party member -- the prominent Palikot included -- who made divisive public comments. COMMENT ¶12. (C) After Tusk announced his decision not to run for the presidency on January 28, he failed to execute a plan to install his personal choice, Komorowski. As a result, Tusk has now delegated the decision to his party's 45,000 members, opening a new chapter in Poland's democratic transformation -- a presidential primary. FEINSTEIN
Wikileaks
Wikileaks: Poland 