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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09WARSAW763.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09WARSAW763 | 2009-07-23 14:57 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Warsaw |
VZCZCXRO4770 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHWR #0763/01 2041457 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231457Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8637 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000763 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CE, EUR/ERA, NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM PARM IR GG PL SUBJECT: POLISH VIEWS ON 27-28 JULY GAERC Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Anthony M. Kolankiewicz for R easons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In advance of this month's meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council, MFA European Correspondent Cyryl Kozaczewski said Poland intended to: -- Advocate for the extension of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia; -- Support tougher sanctions against Iran, especially if Tehran fails to respond to Western, including U.S., offers of engagement, while noting that the EU focus during this GAERC will likely be on Iran's post-election turmoil and the continued detention of French citizen Clothilde Reiss; -- Endorse any EU conclusions on Somalia that might emerge from the GAERC; and -- Ask to raise under AOB the 29 July parliamentary elections in Moldova. END SUMMARY. ------- GEORGIA ------- ¶2. (C) Kozaczewski expected Iran and Georgia to dominate discussion at the upcoming GAERC. On Georgia, he said Warsaw would support extension of the EUMM through 2010. It was important to expand the mission in the wake of the departure of the UN and OSCE missions. To this end, Kozaczewski noted that the EU was considering a 340-strong complement, a figure that included local Georgian employees. He added that the GoP did not have any specific suggestions for U.S. participation in the mission but, in principle, welcomed U.S. inclusion. Once the EU formulated a specific position on U.S. participation, Poland would almost certainly endorse it. ---- IRAN ---- ¶3. (C) On Iran, Kozaczewski observed that the GAERC's focus would center on that country's post-election turmoil and how to respond to the continued detention of Reiss rather than on Iran's nuclear program. In particular, some EU members will suggest that the Union explore opportunities to exploit Iran's internal political rifts. According to Kozaczewski, the Swedish presidency has called for a "gradual" approach to the situation in Iran, calibrated to avoid over-reaction to events, including the detentions of Reiss and, previously, British Embassy employees, and to respond in-kind to possible Iranian overtures for dialogue. Warsaw did not oppose this policy but would press for close coordination between the EU and U.S. positions. He added that the EU remained interested in Iran's ultimate response to the Obama Administration's offers of engagement and would seek to complement U.S. initiatives, but he acknowledged the existence of an unofficial deadline (probably no later than the end of 2009) for Tehran to accept the Western olive branch. ¶4. (C) Kozaczewski asserted that Poland would side with EU members that favored a stronger sanctions regime. Warsaw continues to view the nuclear question as the pivotal issue. He pointed to indications, including from the Polish mission in Tehran, that the Iranians were concerned about a tightening of sanctions, especially on financial transactions, because of their negative impact on an already stressed economy. Whether Iranian concern would translate into a more conciliatory response to the West remained to be seen, but Kozaczewski was not optimistic. At the same time, he emphasized that the EU was also not certain how to deal with the possibility of tougher sanctions, particularly in light of the Swedish presidency's preference for a "gradual" approach. ------- SOMALIA ------- ¶5. (C) Somalia did not rank high on the list of Poland's priorities, Kozaczewski acknowledged, despite the continuing threat of piracy and the deteriorating internal situation in that country. Nonetheless, he expected the EU to reach some conclusions on Somalia during the GAERC, which Poland would likely support. On this note, Warsaw's views tracked closely with the U.S. position, and the Poles will press the EU to assist the African Union to increase the number of AMISOM troops, as well as to aid the Transitional Federal Government to rebuild state institutions and internal security forces. WARSAW 00000763 002 OF 002 Poland will also push the EU to approach Arab/Muslim states to coordinate stabilization efforts in Somalia more effectively. ------- MOLDOVA ------- ¶6. (C) Kozaczewski said Poland would seek inclusion under Any Other Business of the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova. He said FM Radoslaw Sikorski would like to discuss his pre-electoral trip to that country on behalf of the Swedish presidency. ASHE
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